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RYAN INDEMNITY IN MARITIME PROPERTY
DAMAGE CASES: WHAT OF
PROPORTIONTE FAULT?
Francis J. Gormant
In 1956 the Supreme Court in Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. PanAtlantic Steamship Corp. implied a warranty of workmanlike performance in stevedoring contracts. The stevedore's
breach of this warranty entitled the shipowner to full
indemnity for damages paid by the shipowner to injured
longshoremen. This Article discusses the origin and
development of the Ryan warranty and Ryan indemnity,
focusing on post-Ryan statutory and decisional developments. The author advocates the application of principles of
comparative negligence in maritime property damage cases.
1.

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court's 1956 decision in Ryan Stevedoring Co. v.
Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp.1 altered the respective liabilities of
shipowners and stevedores arising out of accidents causing injury or
death of longshore employees of the stevedore occurring while
performing work aboard the shipowner's vessel. Since 1946,
shipowners had been held strictly liable for longshoremen's injuries
caused by a breach of the shipowner's warranty to maintain the
vessel in seaworthy condition. The stevedore employer, on the other
hand, was liable to its employees only to the extent provided by the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers Compensation Act. 2 Ryan
effected no change in the statutory obligation of stevedores to
compensate their employees for job-related injuries. The decision did,
however, afford the shipowner a right to full indemnity from the
stevedore predicated upon the stevedore's breach of a warranty of
workmanlike performance implied in its contract with the shipowner.
Such a breach entitled a shipowner to full indemnity for any
judgment or reasonable settlement amount paid to a third party,
including reimbursement of fees and expenses incurred in defending
the third party's claim. Like the common law doctrine of contribut B.S.F.S., Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, 1963; J.D., Georgetown University, 1969; Lecturer in Admiralty, University of Baltimore, School of
Law; Assistant Editor, American Maritime Cases; Partner, Semmes, Bowen &
Semmes, Baltimore, Maryland. The author gratefully acknowledges the help of
Joyce D. Crowley.
1. 350 U.S. 124, 1956 A.M.C. 9 (1956).
2. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1970 & Supp. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Longshoremen's
Act).
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tory negligence, a breach of the warranty had all-or-nothing
consequences; the degree of fault of the parties was disregarded.
Ryan indemnity caught on quickly as part of the law of
maritime contracts, and during the 1960's it developed into a very
potent doctrine. 3 The lower courts applied it to contexts outside that
in which it had arisen.4 The doctrine grew steadily until the 1970's
when a number of developments in the maritime law, both statutory
and decisional, cut back on its application and eroded its rationale.
In 1972 Congress amended the Longshoremen's Act, overruling
Ryan insofar as it applied to the tri-party personal injury litigation
among longshoremen, shipowners, and stevedores. In addition,
Supreme Court decisions in 1974 and 1975 re-established the right to
contribution among joint tortfeasors in non-collision cases and
adopted a rule allocating damages in collision cases based on
proportionate fault. 5
This article discusses the Ryan warranty and the Ryan
indemnity action in light of these developments. Particular attention
is given to the questionable justification for imposing the "all-ornothing" consequences of Ryan indemnity under an implied
warranty in view of the ability of courts to proportion damages
based on fault. The emphasis of the article is on the applicability of
Ryan indemnity to cases other than those dealing with personal
injury and death, although it is impossible to divorce a discussion of
Ryan and its progeny from personal injury and death cases, where
the doctrine originated.

II. ORIGIN OF THE RYAN DOCTRINE
The implied warranty of workmanlike performance was created
in the context of longshoremen's personal injury litigation. In Ryan,
a longshoreman was injured on a ship while unloading cargo. He
3. See generally Stover, Longshoreman·Shipowner·Stevedore: The Circle of Liabil·
ity, 61 MICH. L. REv. 539 (1963).
4. "[F]rom little acorns big oaks may grow." Delta Engineering Corp. v. Scott, 322
F.2d 11, 18 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.s. 905 (1964). See noteR 24-36 and
accompanying text infra.
5. See notes 85-95 and accompanying text infra. The allocation of damages based
on proportional fault must be distinguished from the principle of joint and
several liability. The Supreme Court has consistently applied the principle of
joint and several liability in maritime property damage cases. The adoption of
proportionate fault does not relieve a joint tortfeasor of responsibility to pay full
damages in situations where the other tortfeasor is insolvent, has absconded, is
immune or excused from liability, or has limited liability. Thus, an innocent
vessel (damaged in a mutual fault collision between two other vessels) can
recover full damages from one of the vessels where the other vessel is unable to
pay one-half of the damages. The Alabama & The Gamecock, 92 U.S. 695 (1875).
As another example, innocent cargo (damaged in a mutual fault collision) can
recover full damages from the non-carrying vessel where the carrying vessel is
excused from liability to cargo under the Harter Act. The Chattahoochee, 173
U.S. 540 (1899). See generally Owen, The Origins and Development of Marine
Collision Law, 51 TULANE L. REV. 759, 804-06 (1977).
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sued the shipowner alleging negligence in the stowage of the cargo
and a breach of the shipowner's duty to provide a seaworthy ship.6
The shipowner filed a third-party complaint against the longshoreman's stevedore employer. The district court found both the
shipowner and the stevedore negligent, but denied the shipowner's
third-party claim for contribution and indemnity.7 The Second
Circuit, reversing on the issue of third-party liability, held that
despite the absence of an express agreement of indemnity, the
stevedore was liable to the shipowner for damages caused by the
breach of its contract to stow the cargo properly and safely.s On
appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Second
Circuit. 9
Promulgation of the Ryan doctrine was to a . large measure
prompted by an earlier Supreme Court decision. In 1946 in Seas
Shipping Company v. Sieracki 10 the Court extended the warranty of
seaworthiness (a form of liability without fault) to include workers
performing traditional seamen's work aboard a vessel. The result
was to increase greatly the number of claims brought against
shipowners by employees covered by the Longshoremen's Act, such
as shipyard workers and longshoremen, to whom the shipowner had
previously owed no duty of seaworthiness. As a no-fault claim,
unseaworthiness imposed a heavy burden of defense on the
shipowner. Often, the unseaworthy condition had been created, or
brought into play, by the stevedore's or shipyard's control of the
performance of work aboard the ship. Through its decision in Ryan
the Court sought to ease the burden placed upon shipowners as a
result of their being held strictly liable for damages caused by the
unseaworthiness of the vessel.
To achieve this end, the Court in Ryan found contracts between
shipowners and stevedores to contain an implied warranty that the
latter would discharge its duties in a workmanlike manner. Where
breach of this implied warranty led to the vessel's becoming
unseaworthy and damages resulted, the shipowner, held strictly
liable, could claim indemnity from the stevedore in a third-party
action. Such an action was based upon the following reasoning. A
contract warranty is an assurance that a fact exists at the time the
contract begins and that it will continue to exist during the term of
the contract.ll Under common law, a breach of a contract warranty
6. Longshoremen were held to possess this right in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki,
328 U.S. 85, 1946 A.M.C. 698 (1946), but the right was statutorily eliminated by
the 1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen's Act, Pub. L. No. 92-576, § 18(a), 86
Stat. 1263 (codified in 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (Supp. 1975».
7. Palazzolo v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 111 F. Supp. 505, 1953 AM.C. 755 (E.D.N.Y.
1953).
8. Palazzolo v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 211 F.2d 277, 1954 AM.C. 766 (2d Cir. 1954).
9. 350 U.S. 124, 1956 AM.C. 9 (1956).
10. 328 U.S. 85, 1946 AM.C. 698 (1946).
11.
A "warranty" is an assurance by one party to a contract of the existence
of a fact upon which the other party may rely. It is intended to relieve
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generally gives rise to a right of indemnity.12 Indemnity is an
obligation of one party (the indemnitor) to pay any losses or
damages incurred by the other party (the indemnitee) including
those resulting from claims by a third person against the indemnitee. An obligation to indemnify can arise out of either a tort or a
contract relationship, and it can be express or implied. 13 Unlike
contribution, indemnity shifts the entire burden to the indemnitor.14
The application of tort theories to shift liability to stevedores
had been effectively foreclosed in Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship
Ceiling & Refitting Corp.15 The Supreme Court denied a shipowner's
claim for contribution from a stevedore-employer found seventy-five
percent at fault for the longshoreman's injuries. Misreading the role
of contribution in American maritime law,ls the Court chose not to
adopt a rule of contribution among joint tortfeasors in non-collision
cases. 17 This holding reinforced the statutory exclusivity of a
stevedore-employer's tort liability under the Longshoremen's Act. ls
The Ryan decision avoided the Halcyon rationale and the
exclusive liability provision of the Longshoremen's Act by basing
the shipowner's recovery on contract indemnity rather than on
contribution among joint tortfeasors. Mr. Justice Burton noted the
contractual relationship between the parties and stated:
Competency and safety of stowage are inescapable elements
of the service undertaken. This obligation is not a quasicontractual obligation implied in law or arising out of a
noncontractual relationship. It is of the essence of petitioner's stevedoring contract. It is petitioner's warranty of
workmanlike service that is comparable to a manufacturer's
warranty of the soundness of its manufactured product. The
shipowner's action is not changed from one for breach of
contract to one for a tort simply because recovery may turn
upon the standard of the performance of petitioner's
stevedoring service. 19
the promisee of any duty to ascertain the fact for himself, and amounts
to a promise to indemnify the promisee for any loss if the fact warranted

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

proves untrue.
17A C.J.S. Contracts § 341 at 325 (1963) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted); see
8. S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 970 (3d ed. 1964). See also 11 WILLISTON, supra,
§§ 1392-1393A (1968); 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1037 at 228-34 (1964).
See authorities cited in note 11 supra.
See 42 C.J.S. Indemnity (1944) and cases cited.
See Digges, Product Liability in Maryland Revisited, 7 U. BALT. L. REV. 1,26-40
(1977); W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS §51 (4th ed. 1971).
342 U.S. 282, 1952 A.M.C. 1 (1952).
See Staring, Contribution And Division of Damages in Admiralty and Maritime
Cases, 45 CAL. L. REV. 304, 329 (1957).
342 U.S. at 285-87, 1952 A.M.C. at 3-5.
The Court declined to intrude where Congress had been so active. 342 U.S. at 287,
1952 A.M.C. at 5; see 33 U.S.C. § 933(i) (1970).
350 U.S. at 133-34, 1956 A.M.C. at 16-17 (footnotes omitted).
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Stevedores were not eager for their employees to bring actions
against shipowners, as the shipowner would recoup its losses by
seeking Ryan indemnity from the stevedore for breach of the
stevedore's implied contractual warranty of workmanlike performance.
Negligence of the shipowner did not bar the shipowner's right to
Ryan indemnity; and, on the other hand, freedom from negligence
did not insulate the stevedore-employer from liability to the
shipowner. In Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v. Oregon
Stevedoring CO.,20 the absence of negligence on the part of the
stevedore did not affect the shipowner's claim for Ryan indemnity.
The Court referred to the juxtaposition of the Ryan warranty to the
shipowner's duty to provide a seaworthy ship:
Where the shipowner is liable to the employees of the
stevedore company as well as its employees for failing to
supply a vessel and equipment free of defects, regardless of
negligence, we do not think it unfair or unwise to require the
stevedore to indemnify the shipowner for damages sustained
as a result of injury-producing defective equipment supplied
by a stevedore in furtherance of its contractual obligations. 21
This development of the warranty was to some extent a
departure from common law concepts of restitution and agency. A
principal's right to recover from an agent who causes the principal
to be liable to a third person was supported by general rules of
restitution and agency, but only if the principal was without fault. 22
The creation of implied contractual indemnity also brought new
interest in common law "tort indemnity" based on determinations of
active and passive negligence. 23 In maritime property damage cases,
indemnity-minded attorneys invoked the right to indemnity based
upon tort concepts. However, apportioning damages based upon the
comparative fault of the parties received little attention.
III. JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE
RYAN WARRANTY SINCE 1956
After seven years of development of Ryan indemnity, a student
commentator observed that "[a]s a legal theory in the abstract, the
20. 376 U.S. 315, 1964 AM.C. 1075 (1964).
21. Id. at 324, 1964 AM.C. at 1083.
22. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 96 (1937); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 401, at Comment d (1958).
23. See Tri-State Oil Tool Indus., Inc. v. Delta Marine Drilling Co., 410 F.2d 178, 1969
AM.C. 767 (5th Cir. 1969) (Bargeowner - Service Contractor); Simpson Timber
Co. v. Parks, 390 F.2d 353, 1968 A.M.C. 566 (9th Cir. 1968) (Shipowner Manufacturer), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 858 (1968); Lawlor v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., 275 F.2d 599, 1960 AM.C. 716 (2d Cir. 1960) (Shipowner Shipyard), cert.
denied, 363 U.S. 844 (1960); 41 AM. JUR. 2d Indemnity §§ 19-27 (1968).
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Ryan doctrine could apparently enjoy unlimited expansion."24 It was
true enough. The Supreme Court and the lower federal courts
developed the Ryan doctrine in a line of decisions generally
favorable to the shipowner-indemnitee. The warranty ran to the
ship, as well as to shipowners. 25 Fees and expenses were included in
the indemnity. The shipowner was entitled to indemnity under the
Ryan warranty even though the shipowner was not the party who
had hired the stevedore. 26 Shipowners asked the courts to recognize
an implied warranty in nearly all their contractual relationships.
The warranty was extended to provide indemnity actions in a
variety of admiralty cases: cargo damage,27 towing contracts,28 ship
repairs,29 ship painting,30 ship cleaning,31 a wharfinger's obligation
to a ship,32 pilotage,33 launch service,34 and a drill barge owner's
contract with an independent drill pipe contractor.35 The Ryan
warranty was extended to non-maritime situations as well. 36
The Supreme Court did not delineate the circumstances
necessary for the application of Ryan indemnity. In his dissent in
Ryan, Justice Black noted that the "precise scope of the indemnity
which the Court finds the stevedore intended to assume is left in
doubt."37 The expansion of the unseaworthiness concept in favor of
24. Comment, The Ryan Doctrine: Present Status and Future Development, 37 TUL.
L. REV. 786, 808 (1963).
25. Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrik Fisser, 358 U.S. 423, 1959 AM.C. 580 (1959).
26. Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Dugan & McNamara, Inc., 364 U.S. 421, 1960 A.M.C.
2260 (1960).
27. Interstate Steel Corp. v. S.S. "Crystal Gem," 317 F. Supp. 112, 1970 AM.C. 617
(S.D.N.Y. 1970); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Vessel TRINITY, 1967 AM.C.
1768 (C.D. Cal. 1967); The shipper or consignee's rights against the carrier,
however, were not affected by Ryan indemnity. These rights and the carrier's
liability are governed by the statutory scheme in The Carriage of Goods by Sea
Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-1315 (1970), and The Harter Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 190-196
(1970). Schnell v. The Vallescura, 293 U.S. 296, 1934 AM.C. 1573 (1934).
28. Tebbs v. Baker Whiteley Towing Co., 407 F.2d 1055, 1969 AM.C. 275 (4th Cir.
1969); Dunbar v. Henry DuBois' Sons Co., 275 F.2d 304, 1960 AM.C. 1393 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 815 (1960).
29. American Export Lines v. Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp., 336 F.2d 525,
1965 A.M.C. 167 (4th Cir. 1964); Booth S.S. Co. v. Meier & Oelhaf Co., 262 F.2d
310, 1959 A.M.C. 1974 (2d Cir. 1958).
30. Mortensen v. AlS Glittre, 348 F.2d 383, 1965 AM.C. 2016 (2d Cir. 1965).
31. H & H Ship Service Co. v. Weyerhaeuser Line, 382 F.2d 711, 1967 AM.C. 2483
(9th Cir. 1967).
32. Dow Chemical Co. v. Barge UM·23B, 424 F.2d 307, 1970 A.M.C. 1622 (5th Cir.
1970).
33. Tampa Ship Repair & Dry Dock Co. v. AP. St. Philip, Inc., 440 F.2d 1193, 1971
AM.C. 1547 (5th Cir. 1971); Barbey Packing Corp. v. The S.S. Stavros, 169 F.
Supp. 897, 1959 A.M.C. 1542 (D. Ore. 1959). But see United States v. Joyce, 511
F.2d 1127, 1975 AM.C. 1498 (9th Cir. 1975) (indemnity based upon negligence).
34. United States v. Tug Manzanillo, 310 F.2d 220, 1963 AM.C. 365 (9th Cir. 1962);
Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. Boston Line and Servo Co., 286 F. Supp. 399,
1968 AM.C. 520 (D. Mass. 1968).
35. Whisenant v. Brewster Bartle Offshore Co., 446 F.2d 394, 1971 AM.C. 1783 (5th
Cir. 1971).
36. See, e.g., General Electric Co. v. Moretz, 270 F.2d 780 (4th Cir. 1959), rehearing
denied per curiam, 272 F.2d 624 (4th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 964 (1960).
37. 350 U.S. at 143. 1956 A.M.C. at 24.
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longshoremen occasioned by Sieracki provided ample nourishment
for development of Ryan indemnity.3s The Fifth Circuit alone
resisted the expansion of Ryan indemnity beyond the facts of
Ryan. 39 As the lower federal courts extended the application of Ryan
indemnity after 1956, the reasons for the expansion were often not
well stated or analyzed.
The development and expansion occurred in the five areas
indicated below.
A. Invocation By A Shipowner Not Exposed To A Third-Party's
Claim Based On Liability Without Fault
Despite general recognition that the implied Ryan warranty was
dependent upon the existence of a shipowner's absolute duty of
seaworthiness,40 Ryan indemnity was questionably extended to
include situations in which shipowners were not exposed to a claim
based on no-fault liability.
For example, in 1957, a time charterer was permitted to invoke
the Ryan warranty where it had been subjected to vicarious liability
to a shipowner for negligence by a third person to whom the vessel
had been entrusted. 41 In cargo cases shipowners were able to obtain
Ryan indemnity against stevedores even though a shipowner's duty
to a shipper with respect to the seaworthiness of the vessel is not
absolute, and only extends to the exercise of due diligence to make
the vessel seaworthy.42 In Tebbs v. Baker Whiteley Towing CO.,43 a
38. The Fifth Circuit noted in Lusich v. Bloomfield S.S. Co., 355 F.2d 770, 1966
AM.C. 191 (5th Cir. 1966), that the development was favorable to the
shipowners.
39.
[T]he Ryan doctrine is closely tied to a vessel and this obligation which
the shipowner owes to those employed on the vessel. We are accordingly
extremely hesistant to extend the burdensome Ryan doctrine to
situations not substantially similar to those which gave birth to the
doctrine. The obligations which the owner of an offshore drilling
platform owes to those employed on it are not sufficiently similar to
those owed by a shipowner to a seaman to permit the extension of the
doctrine.
Loffland Bros. Co. v. Roberts, 386 F.2d 540, 549, 1968 A.M.C. 1463, 1473 (5th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1040 (1968).
The Fifth Circuit adopted this position after the Ryan decision in 1956 and
has maintained it to the present time. In Re Dearborn Marine Service, Inc., 499
F.2d 263, 287 (5th Cir. 1974) (citing cases), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 886 (1975).
40. See, e.g., Davis v. Chas .. Kurz & Co., 483 F.2d 184, 187, 1974 AM.C. 1862, 1865
(9th Cir. 1973); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 472 F.2d 69, 70 (6th Cir.
1972); Barr v. Brezina Constr. Co., 464 F.2d 1141, 1145 (10th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973); Hobart v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 445 F.2d 435, 438,
1971 AM.C. 2633, 2637 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1971); Schwartz
v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 405 F.2d 270, 276, 1969 AM.C. 311, 318
(2d Cir. 1968); DeGioia v. United States Lines Co., 304 F.2d 421, 425, 1962 A.M.C.
1747, 1752-53 (2d Cir. 1962).
41. James McWilliams Blue Line, Inc. v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 245 F.2d 84, 1957
AM.C. 1213 (2d Cir. 1957).
42. 46 U.S.C. §§ 190-196 (1970) (Harter Act); 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-1315 (1970) (Carriage
of Goods by Sea Act).
43. 407 F.2d 1055, 1969 A.M.C. 275 (4th Cir. 1969).
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negligent bailee of a tow was permitted to invoke the Ryan warranty
against the tug even though the bailee had no exposure to absolute
liability.

B. Application Despite Express Disclaimers
The Supreme Court made clear that an express oral or written
agreement was not a prerequisite for Ryan indemnity. Justice Black
dissented and chastized the majority for implying an obligation to
indemnify without "a shred of evidence" that the stevedore had so
agreed. 44 Subsequent lower court decisions recognized, as a general
proposition, that a clear and express disclaimer would prevent Ryan
indemnity. But few contracts were found sufficiently clear and
express, and written provisions limiting a stevedore's liability were
seldom successful.
In Pettus v. Grace Line, Inc.,45 an express contractual provision
setting out the stevedore's liability for negligence did not avoid the
Ryan warranty. In David Crystal, Inc. v. Cunard Steam-ship CO.,46
an express disclaimer of liability for "losses resulting from possible
theft or error in delivery" did not prevent the imposition of Ryan
indemnity against a stevedore for misdelivery of cargo against a
forged delivery order. The court said that "such disclaimers are not
favored and must be strictly construed."47 Even the following
disclaimer was not enough:
This contract constitutes the full agreement between the
parties hereto, and no warranty of any nature is to be
implied from any of the wording of this agreement. 48
The Second Circuit implied a Ryan warranty in favor of a
shipowner even though the stevedoring contract with the consignee
contained an express warranty running only to the consignee. 49 The
Ninth Circuit held that an express assumption of liability for
negligence in a stevedoring contract did not negate the implied Ryan
warranty of workmanlike performance. 50 And, as a final example, a
clause placing responsibility on the shipowner and charterer for
damages as a result of the vessel's failure to comply with the Safety

44. 350 U.S. at 141~44, 1956, AM.C. at 22-25.
45. 305 F.2d 151, 1962 AM.C. 2329 (2d Cir. 1962). See also McCross v. Ratnaker
Shipping Co., 265 F. Supp. 827, 1967 AM.C. 291 (D. Md. 1967).
46. 339 F.2d 295, 1965 AM.C. 39 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 976 (1965).
47. ld. at 300, 1965 AM.C. at 46.
48. Brattoli v. Kheel, 302 F. Supp. 745, 752, 1969 AM.C. 427, 437 (E.D.N.Y. 1969). See
also Caputo v. Kheel, 291 F. Supp. 804, 1969 AM.C. 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
49. Drago v. A/S Inger, 305 F.2d 139, 1963 AM.C. 98 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
925 (1962).
50. Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 336 F.2d 124,
1964 AM.C. 1927 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 973 (1965).
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and Health Regulations for Longshoring was not "clear and
explicit" contract language precluding Ryan indemnity. 51
After the Italia decision, 52 a student author wondered how a
stevedore might avoid Ryan indemnity:

Italia prompts inquiry as to how stevedoring companies
may escape this form of liability. Since federal maritime law
governs the interpretation of the implied warranties,
stevedores may not expect relief from state legislatures.
However, federal law does not prohibit express disclaimers
of strict liability and courts are bound to respect an express
contractual disclaimer of any duty to indemnify in the
absence of negligence. No public policy, such as the unequal
bargaining power of the contracting parties, militates
against such an arrangement between stevedore and
shipowner. Such a disclaimer must be clear, however, for the
Court's decision calls into question holdings that the
recitation of a limited express warranty precludes the
finding of an implied warranty. The decision suggests as
well that the stipulation in the Italia contract imposing
liability upon the shipowner for injuries caused "by reason
ofthe failure of the ship's gear and/or equipment" might not
be sufficient to bar indemnification. 53
All that could be said with certainty was that an explicit
disclaimer in a written stevedoring contract might negate the
implied Ryan warranty.
C. Counsel Fees and Expenses

Recovery of counsel fees and expenses was a feature of the Ryan
doctrine attractive to a prospective indemnitee. The Supreme Court
has not held that a shipowner's litigation expenses are recoverable
under the Ryan indemnity, but the Court in Ryan did cite Section
334 of the Restatement of Contracts, which states that reasonable
litigation expenses are recoverable damages caused by a breach of
contract. 54 The lower federal courts arrived at a consensus that the
foreseeable damages recoverable for a breach of the Ryan warranty

51.
52.
53.
54.

Sanchez v. Lubeck Linie, AG, 318 F. Supp. 821, 1971 A.M.C. 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
376 U.S. 315, 1964 A.M.C. 1075 (1964).
78 HARV. L. REV. 143, 191 (1964) (footnotes omitted).
Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 129 n.3 (1956). The
cited RESTATEMENT section reads as follows:
EXPENSE OF LITIGATION CAUSED BY BREACH OF CONTRACT.
If a breach of contract is the cause of litigation between the plaintiff
and third parties that the defendant had reason to foresee when the
contract was made, the plaintiffs reasonable expenditures in such
litigation are included in estimating his damages.
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS ~ 334 (1932).
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included reasonable attorney's fees and expenses incurred in
defending the injured party's action for damages. 55
The shipowner was entitled to recover its fees and expenses
regardless of whether the shipowner's defense was successfu1. 56 If
the rule were otherwise, the courts reasoned, then there would be "a
premium on losing law suits."57 The shipowner could also be
awarded pre-judgment interest on its fees and expenses. 58 The
shipowner, however, was not entitled to recover fees and expenses
incurred in prosecuting the indemnity action against the stevedore. 59
There were some early and isolated denials of fees and
expenses,60 but only one exception developed. The Third Circuit in
Gilchrist v. Mitsui Sempaku K.K.,61 held that a shipowner should not
be awarded fees and expenses unless the stevedore's breach was the
"sole responsible cause" of the damage.

D. Contributory Negligence Of The Indemnitor's Employee
Established An Automatic Breach Of The Warranty
The Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits held that an employee's
contributory negligence was directly imputed to his employer and
55. The most extensive early analysis of the right of a shipowner to recover fees and
expenses is contained in two near-companion cases decided in Virginia. In
General Electric Co. v. Mason & Dixon Lines, Inc., 186 F. Supp. 761 (W.D. Va.
1960), the judge discussed the right of an indemnitee in a non-maritime case to
receive counsel fees and expenses as part of his indemnification. The court in
that case reviewed the existing case law and text authorities on the subject and
concluded that:
(1) Basically, the indemnitee does have the right to recover
attorneys' fees in an indemnity case.
(2) The right of recovery is not dependent upon a written or express
contract of indemnity but also is applicable to an implied contract of
indemnity.
186 F. Supp. at 766. Ten months after the General Electric decision, another
federal judge in Virginia cited this case and some others for the proposition that
it was "fairly well settled" that an indemnitee could get attorneys' fees from the
indemnitor under an express or implied contract of indemnity. Holley v. The
Manfred Stansfield, 186 F. Supp. 805, 811, 1960 AM.C. 2307, 2316 (E.D. Va.
1960). The rationale was that full indemnification should include reasonable
counsel fees and expenses incurred in defending the third party's claim since the
shipowner would not have been put to such expense had it not been for the
indemnitor's breach of the warranty.
56. AristaCia. biNapores S.A. v. Howard Terminal, 372 F.2d 152, 1967 AM.C. 312
(9th Cir. 1967).
57. Massa v. C.A Venezuelan Navigacion, 332 F.2d 779, 1964 A.M.C. 1375 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 914 (1964).
58. Jones Stevedoring Co. v. Nippo Kisen Co., 419 F.2d 143, 1969 AM.C. 2465 (9th
Cir. 1969).
59. Calderone v. Naviera Vacuba Sf A, 328 F.2d 578, 1964 AM.C. 600 (2d Cir. 1964);
Paliaga v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 301 F.2d 403, 409 n.1, 1962 AM.C. 1632, 1639 n.1
(2d Cir. 1962); Holley v. The Manfred Stansfield, 186 F. Supp. 805, 1960 A.M.C.
2307 (E.D. Va. 1960).
60. See, e.g., Deans v. Kihlstrom, 197 F. Supp. 339, 1961 AM.C. 2273 (E.D. Va. 1961)
(case settled); Cimino v. United States, 1960 AM.C. 2120 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (no
indemnification if shipowner successfully defends).
61. 405 F.2d 763 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 920 (1969).
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constituted a breach of the warranty.62 The Fifth Circuit did not go
so far. It held that the contributory negligence of the employee was
only a factor to be taken into consideration in determining whether
there had been a breach. 63

E. Defenses And Counterattacks
The Supreme Court did establish a defense to Ryan indemnity in
Weyerhaeuser Steamship Co. v. Nacirema Operating CO.64 The
stevedore/indemnitor could defeat the shipowner's Ryan indemnity
claim by showing conduct by the shipowner sufficient to preclude
indemnity.65 Generally, shipowner conduct that amounted to a
material breach of the contract precluded indemnity. More specifically, the shipowner was not entitled to Ryan indemnity when its
conduct prevented, actively hindered, or seriously handicapped the
stevedore's performance. 66
Shipowners occasionally pressed their indemnity claims before a
determination of liability on the main claim. The stevedore's defense
of unripeness was not always successful. In Ellerman Lines, Ltd. v.
Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc.,67 the court held that a shipowner's
Ryan indemnity action was ripe simply because suit papers had
been filed against the shipowner and the shipowner had incurred
some expenses. There was little direct authority in most circuits as to
when a claim for Ryan indemnification was premature. In practice,
however, shipowners and stevedores usually postponed resolution of
the indemnity issue until the time of the trial of the claim against
the shipowner.
The stevedore/indemnitor could also base a defense on causation. Although the breach was divorced from principles of negligence, a causal connection had to be established between the
claimed breach and the harm suffered by the shipowner. 68
62. United States Lines, Inc. v. Jarka Corp., 444 F.2d 26, 1971 AM.C. 1351 (4th Cir.
1971); McLaughlin v. Trelleborgs Angfartygs AlB, 408 F.2d 1334, 1969 AM.C.
1387 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 946 (1969); Arista Cia. DeVapores S.A.
v. Howard Terminal, 372 F.2d 152, 1967 AM.C. 312 (9th Cir. 1967). See also G.
GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAw OF ADMIRALTY § 6-55, at 446 (2d ed. 1975).
63. LeBlanc v. Two-R Drilling Co., 527 F.2d 1316, 1976 A.M.C. 303 (5th Cir. 1976);
DIS Ove Skou v. Herbert, 365 F.2d 341, 1966 AM.C. 2223 (5th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 902 (1970).
64. 355 U.S. 563, 1958 A.M.C. 501 (1958).
65. Id. at 567-68, 1958 AM.C. at 505.
66. See Humble Oil & Refming Co. v. Philadelphia Ship Maintenance Co., 444 F.2d
727, 1971 AM.C. 1356 (3d Cir. 1971); United States Lines, Inc. v. Jarka Corp., 444
F.2d 26, 1971 A.M.C. 1351 (4th Cir. 1971); H & H Ship Servo Co. v. Weyerhaeuser
Line, 382 F.2d 711, 1967 AM.C. 2483 (9th Cir. 1967); DIS Ove Skou v. Herbert,
365 F.2d 341, 1966 AM.C. 2223 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 902 (1970);
Mortensen v. AIS Glittre, 348 F.2d 383, 1965 AM.C. 2016 (2d Cir. 1965). See also
Villareal, Fourteen Years With Conduct Sufficient To Preclude Indemnity, 4 J.
MAR. L. & COM. 309 (1973).
67. 339 F.2d 673, 1965 AM.C. 283 (3d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 812 (1965).
68. Garner v. Cities Service Tankers Corp., 456 F.2d 476,1972 A.M.C. 1980 (5th Cir.
1972).

1978]

Ryan Indemnity

53

The Supreme Court also established a limited counter-action in
favor of stevedores. In Federal Marine Terminals, Inc. v. Burnside
Shipping CO.,69 the Court held that a shipowner owes a duty of due
care to a stevedore, and when this duty is breached the stevedore has
a cause of action in tort to recover the amount of employee
compensation payments caused by the shipowner's negligence. 7o The
Court left open whether the stevedore could recover under two other
theories: (1) an implied contractual warranty in favor of the
stevedore, and (2) a quasi-contractual right to indemnity based on
active/passive negligence concepts. The Court remanded for consideration of these theories,71 but there was no subsequent reported
decision in the case.
IV. LEGISLATIVE AND DECISIONAL
DEVELOPMENTS - 1970-1975
Events in the 1970's have cast doubt on the justification for
Ryan indemnity. In personal injury and death suits by employees
covered under the Longshoremen's Act, the 1972 Amendments 72 and
their legislative history establish that a shipowner may no longer
implead the employer for indemnity. The statutory scheme under the
Longshoremen's Act is paramount and is not to be altered by
judicial gloss. Section 905(b) of the Longshoremen's Act now states
that any agreement or warranty imposing liability on the employer
for damages recovered against a shipowner is declared void:
In the event of injury to a person covered under this
chapter caused by the negligence of a vessel, then such
person or anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages by
reason thereof, may bring an action against such vessel as a
third party in accordance with the provisions of section 933
of this title, and the employer shall not be liable to the vessel
for such damages directly or indirectly and any agreements
or warranties to the contrary shall be void. 73
The original reason for Ryan indemnity is gone because the 1972
Amendments preclude shipowner's liability to injured longshoremen
based upon unseaworthiness. 74
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

394 U.S. 404, 1969 A.M.C. 745 (1969).
Id. at 417, 1969 A.M.C. at 754-55.
Id. at 418-22, 1969 A.M.C. at 755-58.
Pub. L. No. 92-576, 86 Stat. 1263 (amending 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1970».
33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (Supp. 1975) (emphasis added).
Section 905(b) provides in pertinent part as follows:
The liability of the vessel under this subsection shall not be based upon
the warranty of seaworthiness or a breach thereof at the time the injury
occurred.
Legislative history reveals the following reasoning for the amendment:
The Committee also believes that the doctrine of the Ryan case, which
permits the vessel to recover the damages for which it is liable to an
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The Supreme Court first commented on the effects of the 1972
Amendments in a footnote in Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke,
Inc.: 75
The intent and effect of this amendment were to overrule
this Court's decisions in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, and
Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S. S. Corp., insofar as
they made an employer circuitously liable for injuries to its
employee, by allowing the employee to maintain an action
for unseaworthiness against the vessel and allowing the
vessel to maintain an action for indemnity against the
employer.76
The 1972 Amendments brought on a rash of lower court farewells to
the Ryan warranty. Some courts stated flatly that the Ryan
warranty had been abolished. 77 These comments, however, did not
address the expansion of Ryan indemnity beyond personal injury
and death cases. Few maritime attorneys believed that the
enactment of the 1972 Amendments alone would eliminate the
general application of Ryan indemnity to maritime contracts.

injured worker where it can show that the stevedore breaches an express
or implied warranty of workmanlike performance is no longer appropriate if the vessel's liability is no longer to be absolute, as it essentially is
under the seaworthiness doctrine. Since the vessel's liability is to be
based on its own negligence, and the vessel will no longer be liable under
the seaworthiness doctrine for injuries which are really the fault of the
stevedore, there is no longer any necessity for permitting the vessel to
recover the damages for which it is liable to the injured worker from the
stevedore or other employer of the worker.
Furthermore, unless such hold-harmless, indemnity or contribution
agreements are prohibited as a matter of public policy, vessels by their
superior economic strength could circumvent and nullify the provisions
of Section 5 of the Act by requiring indemnification from a covered
employer for employee injuries.
H. R. REP. No. 92-1441, 92d Congo 2d Sess., reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONGo
& AD. NEWS 4698, 4704.
75. 417 U.S. 106, 1974 A.M.C. 537 (1974).
76. Id. at 113 n.6, 1974 AM.C. at 542 n.6 (citations omitted).
77. See, e.g., Valentino V. Rickners Rhederei, G.M.B.H., 552 F.2d 466, 470, 1977
A.M.C. 618, 624 (2d Cir. 1977) ("the abolition of the 'warranty of workmanlike
performance' and its accompanying right to indemnity"); Hudson Waterways
Corp. V. Coastal Marine Serv., Inc., 436 F. Supp. 597, 600 n.2, 1978 AM.C. 341,
343 n.2 (E.D. Tex. 1977) ("The Ryan Doctrine in its original form, has been
abolished"). Judge Wisdom of the Fifth Circuit commented in Brock V. Coral
Drilling, Inc., that the 1972 Amendments eliminate the implied warranty:
The effect of the Amendments is to eliminate the Ryan doctrine,
under which the shipowner could recover against the stevedore for
breach of its warranty of workmanlike service. Since the shipowner
cannot be sued by a Sieracki seaman on the strict liability theory of
unseaworthiness, Ryan indemnity from the stevedore is unnecessary.
Furthermore, the Amendments state that contractual agreements
requiring the stevedore to indemnify the shipowner for such damages are
void as against public policy.
477 F.2d 211, 213 n.l, 1973 AM.C. 1117, 1118 n.1 (5th Cir. 1973).
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Considering the 1972 Amendments and several Supreme Court
decisions of broader application, however, the future of Ryan
indemnity is uncertain. Proportional damages based on degrees of
fault is now the general rule for damages in maritime property
damage cases. The move toward proportional fault began in 1970. In
United States v. Seckinger,78 a contract claim based on negligence,
the Supreme Court showed a preference for allocation of damages
rather than full liability or indemnity being imposed on one party. A
United States Government contractor agreed that it "shall be
responsible for all damages to persons or property that occur as a
result of his fault or negligence." The United States had paid
damages to an injured employee of the contractor, and the Fifth
Circuit ruled that the contract clause did not permit the Government
to recover from the contractor any of the damages paid to the
employee. The Supreme Court preferred a comparative negligence
interpretation of the clause:
A synthesis of all of the foregoing considerations leads
to the conclusion that the most reasonable construction of
the clause is the alternative suggestion of the Government,
that is, that liability be premised on the basis of comparative negligence. In the first place, this interpretation is
consistent with the plain language of the clause, for
Seckinger will be required to indemnify the United States to
the full extent that its negligence, if any, contributed to the
injuries to the employee.
Secondly, the principle that indemnification for the
indemnitee's own negligence must be clearly and unequivocally indicated as the intention of the parties is preserved
intact. In no event will Seckinger be required to indemnify
the United States to the extent that the injuries were
attributable to the negligence, if any, of the United States.
In short, Seckinger will be responsible for the damages
caused by its negligence; similarly, responsibility will fall
upon the United States to the extent that it was negligent. 79
Two years after the enactment of the 1972 Amendments, the
Supreme Court revived the contribution remedy thought to have
been foreclosed by Halcyon. In Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz
Kopke, Inc.,80 the Court redefined and limited the rule against
contribution in maritime cases. The Court followed the interpretation of several appellate courts that the rule against contribution in
non-collision maritime cases was inapplicable where the joint
tortfeasor was not statutorily immune from tort liability.8!
78.
79.
80.
81.

397 U.s. 203 (1970).
Id. at 215-16 (footnotes omitted).
417 U.S. 106, 1974 A.M.C. 537 (1974).
See In re Seaboard Shipping Corp., 449 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 949 (1972); Watz v. Zapata Off·Shore Co., 431 F.2d 100, 1970 A.M.C. 2307
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The most significant decision affecting the future of Ryan
indemnity in property damage cases is United States v. Reliable
Transfer CO.82 Prior to 1975, damages in maritime collision cases
where both parties were at fault were divided equally or were placed
completely on one party in some cases under the "major/minor"
fault rule. 83 Reliable Transfer established ·that damages in a collision
case are to be allocated in proportion to the comparative degree of
the fault of the parties. The lower federal courts are viewing Reliable
Transfer as the latest development in the evolution of admiralty law
towards comparative fault and proportionate recovery and have
applied the rule of comparative fault to various property damage
claims based on negligence. 84
An exception remains, however, in cargo damage cases. The
determination of rights between shipper and carrier is established by
the Harter Act 85 and the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. 86 The
allocation of damages in such cases is controlled by Schnell v. The
Vallescura. 87 There the Court recognized a rule which determined the
damages for which each party is liable, and later decisions
implemented burdens of proof which allowed carriers to avoid that
portion of the damage proved to have been caused by one of the
statutory exceptions provided in the above mentioned acts, such as
perils of the sea. 88 The Second Circuit, for example, declined to apply
Reliable Transfer and disturb this statutory and decisional scheme
in cargo damage suits:
This admiralty cargo suit involves the damage and loss to a
shipment of yams. It also represents an invitation to apply
to cargo suits the doctrine of proportionate fault recently
made applicable to collision and stranding cases by United
States v. Reliable Transfer Co., an invitation which we
decline .
. . . Indeed, this area of maritime law has been governed
for some forty years by a rule which does allow for
apportionment according to relative degree of fault, although an occasional harsh result may arise, as when the
(5th Cir. 1970); Horton & Horton, Inc. v. TIS J. E. Dyer, 428 F.2d 1131, 1971
A.M.C. 995 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 993 (1971).
82. 421 U.S. 397, 1975 AM.C. 541 (1975). For a discussion of the place of Reliable
Transfer in the historical development of American collision law, see Owen, The
Origins and Development of Marine Collision Law, 51 TUL. L. REV. 759 (1977).
83. See City of New York, 147 U.S. 72, 85 (1893).
84. See, e.g., Hanover Insurance Co. v. Puerto Rico Lighterage Co., 553 F.2d 728,
1977 A.M.C. 850 (1st Cir. 1977).
85. 46 U.S.C. §§ 190-196 (1970).
86. 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-1315 (1970).
87. 293 U.S. 296, 1934 AM.C. 1573 (1934).
88. J. Gerber & Co. v. S.S. Sabine Howaldt, 437 F.2d 580, 1971 AM.C. 539 (2d Cir.
1971); Pioneer Import Corp. v. The Lafcomo, 138 F.2d 907 (2d Cir. 1943), cert .
. denied, 321 U.S. 766 (1944).
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carrier is unable to sustain its final burden of providing the
relative degree of fault. In such a case the carrier must bear
all the damages even though it has been established that
those damages were in part caused by occurrences for which
it is excepted from liability. Nevertheless, the rule of Schnell
v. The Vallescura, clearly stated and frequently applied,
must govern in this case. 89
Similarly, in mutual fault collision cases involving cargo
damage, cargo interests are entitled to recover full damages from the
non-carrying ship.90
As previously mentioned, damages are not apportioned in
personal injury and death claims of maritime employees covered by
the Longshoremen's Act. The 1972 Amendments and the Kopke
decision give preeminence to the statutory immunity of maritime
employers under the compensation scheme of the Longshoremen's
Act. Although the 1972 Amendments did not alter the joint and
several liability of third parties suable for negligence under sections
905(b) and 933, shipowners are seeking the application of comparative negligence principles to establish an "equitable credit" reducing
their liability in personal injury and death cases. 91
The current trend towards allocation of damages based on
degrees of fault can be traced to some early criticisms of the Halcyon
and Ryan decisions. In a very thorough and scholarly article on
damages in admiralty and maritime cases written in 1957, Graydon
Staring demonstrated that the dictum in Halcyon limiting the
application of contribution to collision cases was incorrect. 92 \The
article also pointed out that contrihution had been applied in
admiralty to contract claims based upon negligence:
Despite the inclination of courts to discuss contribution
as though it were only a tort matter, it may be more
desirable to say that it arises from a breach of duty. The
somewhat artificial dichotomy which exists in the common
law between torts and contracts has not traditionally been
observed in admiralty. The admiralty courts are civil law
courts and the civil law in general has never experienced the
agonies of the common law writ system and has never
observed a sharp distinction between contractual and
delictual rights. Accordingly, in numerous.instances already
cited, contribution or division has been allowed in cases of
89. Vana Trading Co. v. S.8. "Mette Skou," 556 F.2d 100, 106, 1977 A.M.C. 702,
709-10 (2d Cir.) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 892 (1977).
90. The Chattahoochee, 173 U.S. 540 (1899).
91. Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 577 F.2d 1153, _
A.M.C.
_
(4th Cir. 1978). See also Coleman and Daly, Equitable Credit: Apportion·
ment of Damages, 35 MD. L. REV. 351 (1976).
92. Staring, supra note 16, at 345. Staring's article was cited four times in the
Reliable Transfer decision.
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breach of contract. While contribution for breach of contract
raises certain problems, the flexibility of admiralty on this
point, as on others where it contrasts with common law
rigidity, should be recognized and perpetuated as a means of
doing substantial justice.93
Professors Gilmore and Black, completing the first edition of
their text in the Spring of 1956, also pointed out that full indemnity
under the Ryan doctrine was no improvement over the denial of
contribution among joint tortfeasors in non-collision cases decreed
by Halcyon. 94 Subsequently, Congress enacted the 1972 Amendments and chose to insulate maritime employees from contribution
and indemnity in personal injury and death cases. These changes
were effected, however, more out of concern for burgeoning federal
court caseloads, than as an attempt to improve admiralty jurisprudence. But in property damage cases the "wholehog" results of Ryan
indemnity continue to be unjustified.
V. SURVEY OF RECENT RYAN INDEMNITY CASES
A. Non-Personal Injury And Non-Death Cases
1.

The Continued Existence And Application Of The Warranty

The effects of these legislative and decisional developments are
slowly materializing, but shipowners have continued to receive the
benefits of Ryan indemnity in several recent cargo damage cases
despite the qualified nature of their duty to shippers. 95 These
93. Id. at 334 (footnotes omitted).
In this situation Halcyon suggested that the whole loss would fall on the
94.
shipowner, the employer paying nothing (no contribution among
tortfeasors). The obvious unjustness of the rule no doubt stimulated the
lower courts in their invention of ways to evade it. Under Ryan, on the
other hand, at least in the absence of a contrary agreement in the
contract between employer and shipowner, the whole loss falls on the
employer, the negligent shipowner paying nothing. This result seems
quite as contrary to natural justice as that dictated by Halcyon.
. .. Despite Halcyon the admiralty tradition of a comparative
negligence rule, with division of damages, is impressively deep-rooted. If
the Court would overrule Halcyon in its conceptual aspects (as it has by
Ryan overruled it in practical effect) and adopt, or for that matter
'fashion', a comparative negligence rule, the way would be open to
protect the interests of the employee without coming to the unhappy
wholehog results of either Halcyon or Ryan.
G. GILMORE AND C. BLACK, THE LAw OF ADMIRALTY, at 374 (1st ed. 1957)
(footnote omitted). For a recent commentary and analysis of the law of damages
in admiralty, see Allbritton, Division of Damages in Admiralty, 2 J. MAR. L. &
COM. 323 (1971).
95. SS Amazonia v. New Jersey Export Marine Carpenters, Inc., 564 F.2d 5, 1977
A.M.C. 1885 (2d Cir. 1977); F. J. Walker, Ltd. v. Motor Vessel "Lemoncore," 561
F.2d 1138, 1978 A.M.C. 300 (5th Cir. 1977); Cameco, Inc. v. S.S. American Legion,
514 F.2d 1291, 1974 A.M.C. 2568 (2d Cir. 1974); Stein Hall & Co. v. S.S. Concordia
Viking, 494 F.2d 287. 1974 A.M.C. 275 (2d Cir. 1974); Master Shipping Agency,
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decisions do not indicate that any consideration was given to the
lack of shipowner exposure to the seaworthiness duty or to the
availability of contribution and proportionate fault.
Shipowner liabilities stemming from breach of the warranty of
seaworthiness was discussed by the Second Circuit in Fairmont Ship
Corp. v. Chevron International Oil CO.,96 a case involving tug
assistance provided as part of a bunkering contract. The shipowner
sued Chevron to recover damages to its vessel when she fetched up
against a dike due to negligence of the tugs furnished by the oil
company. The court distinguished the determination of whether the
Ryan warranty could appropriately be implied in a contract from a
determination of whether full Ryan indemnity is owing should the
Ryan warranty, once it is held to exist, be breached. The court
observed that:
[T]he primary issue in Ryan was the indemnity problem,
and the Court used the warranty of workmanlike performance as a vehicle on which to base the stevedore's liability
to indemnify the shipowner. Ryan's recognition of the
existence of a warranty of workmanlike performance in a
maritime service contract was merely incidental to its
particularized holding that the shipowner in the circumstances there presented was entitled to indemnity. Thus, the
factors to be considered in determining whether a contract
includes a warranty of workmanlike performance are
entirely separate from the factors that go into the determination of whether that warranty encompasses an obligation to
indemnity.97
The court concluded that the Ryan warranty still had validity, but
offered the new rationale that "Ryan, by necessary implication,
confirmed the applicability to maritime service contracts of the
hornbook rule of contract law that one who contracts to provide
services impliedly agrees to perform in a diligent and workmanlike
manner."98 In considering whether a warranty should encompass an
obligation to indemnify, the court recited the elements of Ryan
indemnity in a way that would restrict further expansion:
[A] shipowner, relying on the expertise of another party (the
contractor), enters into a contract whereby the contractor
agrees to perform services without supervision or control by
the shipowner; the improper, unsafe or incompetent execuInc. v. M.S. Farida, 1976 AM.C. 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (shipowner bound to prove
the exercise of due diligence and at the same time entitled to the warranty of
workmanlike performance from the stevedore company).
96. 511 F.2d 1252, 1975 AM.C. 261 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 838 (1975).
97. Id. at 1259, 1975 A.M.C. at 270.
98. Id., 1975 AM.C. at 271.
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tion of such services would foreseeably render the vessel
unseaworthy or bring into playa pre-existing unseaworthy
condition; and the shipowner would thereby be exposed to
liability regardless of fault. 99
The court noted that in Fairmont, it was not really dealing with
an indemnity case. However, having found that Chevron impliedly
warranted to perform in a workmanlike manner, and that it had
breached this Ryan warranty, the court held the oil company liable
for all the damages (making the result for practical purposes the
same as if the parties had stood in the relationship of indemnitor to
indemnitee). Thus, while the court conceptually distinguished the
Ryan warranty from the Ryan indemnity, likening the former to "a
hornbook rule of contract law," and employing, inter alia, the
concept of liability based on unseaworthiness to delimit the scope of
the application of the latter, there was no discussion of apportionment of damages, whether awarded in an indemnity situation or
otherwise. Later that year, however, the Supreme Court in Reliable
Transfer addressed the issue of apportionment of property damage
awards in a way that may presage the death knell of "all or
nothing" awards for breach of the Ryan warranty.
In Flunker v. United States,lOO the Ninth Circuit avoided an
endorsement of the Ryan doctrine in situations where the shipowner
was not faced with no-fault liability:
The appropriate course is to require that, in the absence of
express contract, a covenant of workmanlike performance
will not be implied in favor of a shipowner unless there is a
relationship between the tortfeasor and the shipowner in the
context of shipping that makes the implication reasonable. lol
In a footnote, the court observed that "[m]ost cases to date have
implied such a warranty only when the shipowner owes a non-fault
duty to the plaintiff. [Citing Fairmont]. We do not need to decide
whether the warranty of workmanlike service extends beyond nonfault situations."lo2
Another recent decision introduced negligence considerations to
the application of Ryan indemnity in situations where the shipowner
is not exposed to liability on some no-fault basis. This is plainly
contrary to the principles of Ryan indemnity developed in the Italia
case. I03 In Navieros Oceanikos, S.A. v. S.T. Mobil Trader,lo4 a
99. Id. at 1258, 1975 A.M.C. at 269 (footnotes omitted).
100. 528 F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 1975).
101. Id. at 243.
102. Id. at n.3.
103. Italia Societa per Azoni di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376 U.S. 315,
1964 A.M.C. 1075 (1964). See text accompanying notes 20-23 supra.
104. 554 F.2d 43, 1977 A.M.C. 739 (2d Cir. 1977), noted in 9 J. MAR. L. & COM. 273
(1978).
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shipowner sued a barge owner for damage caused by a fire that
broke out during bunkering operations. The district court had found
the barge twenty-five percent at fault and the shipowner seventy-five
percent at fault and refused to place full responsibility on the
bargeowner under Ryan indemnity. The Second Circuit affirmed.
The existence of an implied warranty of workmanlike performance
in the bunkering contract was recognized. In the absence of exposure
to liability without fault, however, the court stated that there would
be no reason to indemnify a shipowner who was contributorily
negligent. 105
Other court decisions, however, have rejected any limitation on
Ryan indemnity based on the nature of the shipowner's liability to a
third person. In Henry v. AIS Ocean,IOS the court said that "[T]he
stevedore's liability for breach of warranty does not rest upon the
nature of the shipowner's liability (i.e., whether it is based upon
unseaworthiness rather than upon negligence) but upon the
stevedore's own contractual obligation to the shipowner."lo7
The federal appellate decisions since 1972 do indicate that the
expansion of Ryan indemnity is over. The Fifth Circuit cases
cautioning against expansion of Ryan indemnity are now joined by
decisions from the Second and Ninth Circuits which pull back from
Ryan indemnity. The Fifth Circuit reiterated its position in 1975:
The dying gasp at a WWLP [warranty of workmanlike
performance] under Ryan meets with a similar lack of
success since we have repeatedly resisted all efforts to
project this implied indemnity concept outside the special
105. Id. at 46-47, 1977 A.M.C. at 742-44. See also Fitzgerald v. Compania Naviera La
Molinera, 394 F. Supp. 402 (E.D. La. 1974), in which the court held that an
indispensable predicate for applying Ryan indemnity was the shipowner's nondelegable duty of seaworthiness. In S.S. Seatrain Louisiana v. California
Stevedore and Ballast Co., 424 F. Supp. 180, 1977 AM.C. 1427 (N.D. Cal. 1976),
Judge Orrick examined the background of the Ryan indemnity. He called the
shipowner's liability under the unseaworthiness doctrine the underlying
rationale for the implied right of indemnity. Observing that "the Ryan
indemnity route was justifiably foreclosed since the underlying rationale for it,
the mitigation of the harsh no-fault doctrine of a warranty of seaworthiness, had
been removed." 424 F. Supp. at 183, 1977 A.M.C. at 1430.
The relationship was highlighted by one district court as follows:
The implied agreement to indemnify a party held liable for unseaworthiness arose in maritime contracts where the indemnitor was to provide a
service for the vessel owner. [Citing Ryan.] One overriding principle may
be distilled from the cases discussing this implied [clause] in maritime
contracts: where some act of the indemnitor performed within the sphere
of the contractual relationship subjects the indemnitee to liability
without fault, indemnity is due.
Hamilton v. Canal Barge Co., 395 F. Supp. 978, 989, 1977 AM.C. 2274, 2286 (E.D.
La. 1975).
106. 512 F.2d 401, 1975 AM.C. 162 (2d Cir. 1975).
107. Id. at 406, 1975 AM.C. at 167. See also D'Esposito v. Lipsett Steel Products, 1976
AM.C. 818 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976) (vessel's liability to ~arine surveyor for
negligence subjected a stevedore to indemnity based upon an implied warranty).
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circumstances of the shipowner relationships that evoked
the doctrine in the first place absent any contractual
provisions in the underlying contracts. lOS
And again in 1977:
We "have held that the Ryan [WWLP] doctrine is
closely tied to a vessel and this obligation which the
shipowner owes to those employed on the vessel. * * * We
are accordingly extremely hesitant to extend the burdensome Ryan doctrine to situations not substantially similar to
those which gave birth to the doctrine. The obligations
which the owner of an offshore drilling platform owes to
those employed on it are not sufficiently similar to those
owed by a shipowner to a seaman to permit the extension of
the doctrine." 109
In Sims v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway,1l0 an implied warranty
of a wharfinger to a shipowner was limited to the conditions of the
berth, the removal or notice of dangerous obstructions at the berth,
and provision of a safe means of access to a berthed ship. The court
held that this did not amount to a warranty of "the safe condition of
all property which it may own in the dock area."1l1 A number of
other court decisions also show a trend against further expansion of
Ryan indemnity.1l2
108. Law v. Sea Drilling Corp., 510 F.2d 242, 252, 1977 A.M.C.2379 (5th Cir. 1975)
(footnote omitted).
109. Nutt v. Loomis Hydraulic Testing Co., 552 F.2d 1126, 1131 n.17, 1977 A.M.C.
2340, 2347 n.17 (5th Cir. 1977) (citation omitted).
110. 520 F.2d 556 (6th Cir. 1975).
111. Id. at 561.
112. In Pastore v. Taiyo Gyogyo K.K., 1977 A.M.C. 926 (E.D. Pa. 1977), the court
stated that there was no reason to extend Ryan indemnity to a shipowner's claim
for indemnity against the City of Philadelphia. The shipowner had been sued by
a firefighter for personal injury. The court dismissed any arguments for
indemnity from the City on the basis that "no special legal relationship between
the employer and the shipowner [existed] which would support such a claim."
1977 A.M.C. 940 n.9. In First Mississippi Corp. v. Fielder Towing Co., 430 F.
Supp. 39 (N.D. Miss. 1976), the court refused on the facts to imply the Ryan
warranty into a written contract between a ship broker and a shipowner. In
Manhattan Oil Transp. Co. v. M/V Salvadore, 1976 A.M.C. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
an on·board inspector was held not to make or give a warranty of workmanlike
performance to a shipowner. In Burgess v. M/V Tamano, 373 F. Supp. 839, 1974
A.M.C. 2069 (S.D. Me. 1974), aff'd, 559 F.2d 1200 (1st Cir. 1977), the court held
that the Coast Guard did not owe an implied warranty of workmanlike
performance to a shipowner in connection with the Coast Guard's performance
of its containment and clean-up activities after an oil spill. See also Orient
Overseas Line v. Globemaster Baltimore, Inc., 33 Md. App. 372, 365 A.2d 325,
1976 A.M.C. 2365 (1976), where a state appellate court was presented the issue of
whether a terminal operator owed the Ryan warranty to the carrier. The court
avoided the issue by holding the shipowner's conduct sufficient to preclude
indemnity. But see Hermann C. Stark, Inc. v. Finn Lines, _
F.2d _ , 1978
A.M.C. 1330 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (terminal operator owes duty to shipowner).
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Disclaimer

There are only a few recent cases involving express disclaimers
which attempt to negate Ryan indemnity, but the issue is receiving
more attention. That the courts are discussing this point at all
should give some comfort to maritime contractors who still hope that
an express disclaimer will be recognized by the courts as negating or
limiting Ryan indemnity.
In Elgie & Co. v. S.S. S.A. Nederburg,113 the contract between
the stevedore and the shipowner limited the stevedore's liability to
loss caused by fraud or negligence. An integration clause stated that
"no warranty of any nature shall be implied from any of the wording
of this agreement."1l4 The shipowner contended that the Ryan
warranty could not be eliminated through such an express
disclaimer. The court held that a warranty of workmanlike
performance was implied in maritime service contracts but did not
decide the effect of the disclaimer. On the other hand, the Ryan
warranty was not implied in a stevedoring contract between the
Military Sea Transportation Service 11 5 and a stevedore, which
contained a provision that specifically disclaimed indemnity if:
... the unseaworthiness of the vessel or failure or defect of
the gear or equipment furnished by the Government
contributed jointly with the fault or negligence of the
Contractor in causing such damage, injury or death, and the
Contractor, its officers, agents, and employees, by the
exercise of due diligence, could not have discovered such
unseaworthiness or defect of gear or equipment, or through
the exercise of due diligence could not otherwise have
avoided such damage, injury, or death.1J6
3.

Counsel Fees And Expenses

Whether a new approach to Ryan indemnity will affect the
award of counsel fees and expenses is unknown at this time. In 1974,
the Third Circuit kept alive its Gilchrist ll7 exception denying fees
and expenses where the stevedore's breach was not the sole cause of
the injury. A concurring opinion questioned the validity of the
Gilchrist decision, but nevertheless recognized that "there may be
unusual circumstances which would justify the denial of attorney's
fees and expenses despite the right to recover indemnity proper."ll!!
113. 1976 A.M.C. 2446 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
114. [d. at 2459.

115. Now the Military Sealift Command.
116. United States v. Northern Metal Co., 379 F. Supp. 1131, 1137 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
117. Gilchrist v. Mitsui Sempaku K.K., 405 F.2d 763 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 920 (1969). See text accompanying note 61 supra.
118. Burris v. Global Bulk Carriers, Inc., 505 F.2d 1173, 1179, 1975 A.M.C. 226, 235 (3d
Cir. 1974) (Hunter, J. concurring).
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The Fourth Circuit has developed an "equitable modification" of the
normal indemnification rule and denied an award of fees and
expenses even though the shipowner was awarded indemnity on a
settlement amount paid to a iongshoreman.1l 9
Where one party has breached a contract promise, the measure
of damages is the consequences "reasonably foreseeable at the time
when [the contract] was entered into as probable if the contract were
broken."l20 This measure of damages would not normally include
counsel fees and expenses of a direct action against the party who
breached the contract. The American rule is generally against
awarding fees to a winning party in litigation except where
permitted by statute. 121 Furthermore, in most maritime cases the
indemnitee's defense costs are covered by insurance under a
standard P & I (protection and indenmity) policy, a collision liability
clause in a Hull policy, or by a separate F D & D (freight, demurrage
and defense).
4.

Defenses

Continued recognition of Ryan indemnity has carried with it the
continued availability of the "conduct sufficient to preclude
indemnity" defense under Weyerhaeuser. 122 In Compagnie Generale
Transatlantique v. United States,123 a shipowner sued the United
States (as owner of a Navy ship) for damages. The United States
sought indemnity against a towing company. After recognizing the
existence of the Ryan warranty in towing contracts, the court held
that the United States would not be entitled to indemnity because it
actively hindered the indemnitor's performance. In Breton Island
Co. v. Kennedy Marine Engine CO.,124 an owner of a fishing vessel
sued an engine repairer under an implied warranty of workmanlike
performance. The engine repairer invoked the Weyerhaeuser defense
and was successful in defeating the indemnity claim. One wonders
what the results could be in such cases if the courts allocated
damages based on comparative fault.
The ripeness of a Ryan indemnity action may be challenged. A
Fourth Circuit decision held that indemnity was not ripe merely
because suit had been filed against the shipowner. 125 The court
reasoned that the absence of a trial determining liability and the
119. Farrell Lines, Inc. v. Carolina Shipping Co., 1974 AM.C. 1178 (4th Cir. 1974),
reh. denied per curiam, 509 F.2d 53, 1975 A.M.C. 978 (4th Cir. 1975).
120. 11 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1344 (3d ed. 1968).
121. Alyeska Pipeline Servo CO. V. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975). See
Hermann C. Stark V. Finn Lines, _
F.2d - - . 1978 AM.C. 1330 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) (fees awarded).
122. 355 U.S. 563, 1958 AM.C. 501 (1958). See text accompanying notes 64-66 supra.
123. 522 F.2d 148, 1975 A.M.C. 1104 (2d Cir. 1975) (per curiam).
124. 406 F. Supp. 820, 1977 AM.C. 1800 (S.D. Miss. 1976).
125. A/S J. Ludwig Mowinckles Rederi v. Tidewater Constr. Corp., 559 F.2d 928,1977
AM.C. 1505 (4th Cir. 1977).
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absence of a settlement made the indemnity action not ripe because
of the possibility of incongruous results.
A defense to Ryan inderpnity based on a state contract statute of
limitations was successful in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v.
Callanan Marine Corp.126 In that case, a shipper sued a barge owner
for cargo loss, and the barge owner impleaded the towing company.
The court, applying laches, held that the running of the three-year
state statute of limitations shifted to plaintiff a burden of showing
why the action should be allowed. On the other hand, in Federal
Commerce and Navigation Co. v. Calumet Harbor Terminals, Inc.,127
a one-year suit limitations clause in a terminal tariff did not bar an
indemnity claim in the absence of actual notice of the tariff
provision.

B. Personal Injury And Death Cases
While one of the main purposes of the 1972 Amendments was to
eliminate Ryan indemnity in personal injury and death cases, there
may still be some life to Ryan indemnity even in these situations.
Section 905(b) of the Longshoremen's Act declares "void" any
warranties or agreements between a "vessel" and a covered
employer,128 but Ryan indemnity had expanded to a point where
parties other than "vessels" were asserting Ryan indemnity actions.
The issue has arisen in several cases.
Two good examples are Brkaric v. Star Iron & Steel CO.129 and
Zapico v. Bucyrus-Erie CO.l30 Brkaric involved a suit brought by a
longshoreman against a manufacturer of a crane, who filed a thirdparty claim for indemnity and contribution against the stevedoreemployer. The indemnity claim was allowed on the basis that
employers covered under the Longshoremen's Act may still be liable
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

389 F. Supp. 436 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
542 F.2d 437, 1976 AM.C. 2568 (7th Cir. 1976).
33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (Supp. 1975).
409 F. Supp. 516, 1976 AM.C. 1572 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
434 F. Supp. 567, 1977 A.M.C. 2068 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), reu'd, _
F.2d _ , 1978
A.M.C. __ (2d Cir. 1978). See also White v. Texas Eastern Transmission Corp.,
512 F.2d 486, 1976 AM.C. 1153 (5th Cir. 1975) (manufacturer of component's part
sued employer covered under the Longshoremen's Act for breach of the implied
warranty; indemnification rejected), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1049 (1976); Spadola v.
Viking Yacht Co., 441 F. Supp. 798, 1978 AM.C. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (personal
injury suit by a longshoreman against shipper/yacht owner who filed thirdparty complaint against stevedore/employer for contribution and indemnity; the
claim for contribution was rejected under Halcyon, the claim for indemnity was
rejected under Section 905(b) which prohibits such agreements and Section 905(a)
which makes the stevedore's liability exclusive); Meyers v. J.A McCarthy, Inc.,
428 F. Supp. 656 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (indemnification suit by stevedore against
employer who loaded trucks aboard the ship; the stevedore was different from the
company that loaded the trucks; indemnification against the employer rejected);
Standard Fruit & S.S. Co. v. Metropolitan Stevedoring Co., 52 Cal. App. 3d 305,
125 Cal. Rptr. 111, 1976 AM.C. 196 (1975) (in order to effect the Congressional
intent of the 1972 Amendments, the terms "vessel" and "charterer" should be
given the broadest possible interpretation in connection with eliminating
indemnity suits against statutorily immune employers).
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to a non-vessel for contribution or indemnity. In Zapico, a
longshoreman was injured as a result of negligent manufacture of a
truck crane being shipped to Europe. He sued the manufacturershipper who in tum sought indemnity against the stevedoreemployer alleging (1) it was a third-party beneficiary to the
stevedore's Ryan warranty and (2) the breach of an independent
duty owed to it by the stevedore. The district court held that a
stevedore-employer was not statutorily immune from a manufacturer's claim for contribution or indemnity. The Second Circuit
reversed. Judge Friendly, writing for the court, was somewhat
reluctant in denying the indemnity claim, but did so because there
was not enough evidence to imply an agreement to indemnify;
Given the clear statutory language and the absence of
legislative history at variance with it, we would hesitate to
hold that sec. 905(b) by its own force cuts off the availability
of Ryan indemnity to a non-vessel in all cases where the
concurring negligence of a stevedoring company has caused
injuries to the latter's employees . . . .
However, even if so much should be accepted, Bucyrus
still has the heavy burden of finding an implied agreement
by the stevedore to indemnify it.
On these facts, therefore, we find that there is simply
not enough of a nexus to imply an agreement by ACL [the
stevedore] to indemnify Bucyrus based on the independent
contract between ship and stevedore. 131
VI. CONCLUSION
There will be a re-examination of the rationale of Ryan
indemnity resulting in different and more limited applications. The objective should be to avoid the all-or-nothing
consequences of Ryan indemnity in property damage cases
in favor of a proportionate allocation of damages, unless the
contracting parties have expressly provided for indemnity or
designated the party who is responsible for loss or damage. 132

131. Zapico v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., _
F.2d _ , 1978 A.M.C. _
(2d Cir. 1978).
132. By the terms of many time and voyage charters, shipowners often have a right to
indemnity against the charterer by virtue of the terms of the charter. Usually,
the shipowner has a right of indemnification against the charterer for all
damages to the cargo which do not arise out of the unseaworthiness of the vessel.
This is an example of how the written terms of a contract between commercial
entities dealing in maritime affairs should govern the existence of warranties.
See Nichimen Co. v. M.V. Farland, 462 F.2d 319, 1972 A.M.C. 1573 (2d Cir. 1972);
Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800, 1971 A.M.C. 2383 (2d Cir.
1971).
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The second edition of The Law of Admiralty,133 published in
1975, notes the passing of Ryan indemnity in personal injury and
death actions, but presumes that it will continue in other types of
losses:
The Ryan warranty of workmanlike performance
<WOW) is, clearly enough, dead with respect to the shifting
of liability from shipowner (or 'vessel') to employer for
damages recoverable in the § 905(b) negligence action.
Presumably the stevedore, shipbuilder or ship repairer
remains liable under normal principles of contract law for
other losses caused by his default or breach. 134
Yet today, one must question whether any purpose is served by Ryan
indemnity based on an implied warranty. The all-or-nothing aspect
of Ryan indemnity is off the course charted by recent Supreme Court
admiralty decisions and is unnecessary when courts are able to
assess fault and divide damages. The Kopke decision allows
contribution among joint tortfeasors who are not statutorily immune
from tort liability. Reliable Transfer's allocation of damages based
on comparative fault has been extended beyond collision cases to
other kinds of property damage cases. Seckinger favors a comparative negligence interpretation of contractual provisions relating to
responsibility for loss or damage.
Understandably, the lower federal courts may be hesitant to
reject previously accepted claims for Ryan indemnity on the basis of
these developments:
It may be, as the stevedore argues most persuasively in
its petition for rehearing, that the general thrust of Kopke is
in the direction of a sort of tort indemnity in cases of this
type, where contribution among the joint tort-feasors would
be the rule[,] but the fact remains that Kopke did not
purport to overrule Ryan and Weyerhaeuser wherein the
principle of indemnity on which the shipowner's action was
predicated was dElveloped. Those cases are plain to the point
that, unless the ship's fault is sufficient to preclude
indemnity, the ship is entitled to indemnity from the
stevedore under circumstances such as those here. While we
recognize the equitable appeal of the claim of apportionment
raised by the stevedore, we do not feel it appropriate for us to
do what the Supreme Court in Kopke chose not to do; any
reversal or change in the scope of Ryan and Weyerhaeuser
should come from the Supreme Court and not from an
intermediate court. 135
133. G. GILMORE AND C. BLACK, THE LAw OF ADMIRALTY (2d ed. 1975).
134. ld., § 6-57 at 451.
135. Farrell Lines, Inc. v. Carolina Shipping Co., 509 F.2d 53, 54-55, 1975 A.M.C. at
978, 979-80 (4th Cir. 1975).
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Nevertheless, the rules of contribution and apportionment of
damages can now be given general application in maritime property
damage cases. The federal courts can apply these rules to most
property damage cases without risking the upset of established
statutory liability schemes which exist in maritime personal injury
and death cases. An example is Navieros Oceanikos, S.A. v. S. T.
Mobile Trader,136 discussed previously in the article. There is little
doubt that property damage claims based on tort will be subject to
proportionate fault. 137 The difficulty, largely conceptual, lies with
contractual property damage claims that are in reality based on
negligence.
The Second Circuit's decision in Fairmont demonstrates the
conceptual difficulties courts have when dealing with contractual
claims based on negligence. The court supported the Ryan warranty
on that principle of basic contract law that implies in every contract
for work or services a duty to perform diligently and in a
workmanlike manner. 13S Many states with maritime interests
recognize such an implied warranty in contracts for work or
services,139 and Williston specifically refers to such a warranty.140
136. 554 F.2d 43, 1977 AM.C. 739 (2d Cir. 1977).
137. In Master Shipping Agency, Inc. v. M.S. Farida, 571 F.2d 131, 1978 AM.C. 1267
(2d Cir. ·1978), a stevedore and marine lasher were held "jointly and severally"
liable to a shipowner for cargo damage and ship damage caused by inadequate
stowage and lashing of heavy tractors. Although the court applied Ryan
indemnity as between the shipowner and the stevedore and lasher, the liabilities
of the latter parties inter se were governed by Kopke and Reliable Transfer.
Whether the shipowner was negligent was not discussed; the court noted only
that the shipowner did not prevent or handicap the stevedore or lasher in the
performance of their duties.
138. 511 F.2d at 1259, 1975 AM.C. at 264. See 17 AM. JUR. 2d Contracts § 371 at 814
(1964). See also 9 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1012C at 38-39 (3d ed. 1967); 17A
C.J.S. Contracts § 329 at 292-93 (1963); Annot. 25 AL.R.2d 1085 (1952).
139. Sherrill v. Alabama Appliance Co., 240 Ala. 46,197 So. 1 (1940) (reasonable skill
and diligence required in service contract); C.P. Robbins & Assoc. v. Stevens, 53
Ala. App. 432, 301 So.2d 196 (1974) (construction contract contains implied duty
to perform with ordinary skill and workmanship); Kuitems v. Covell, 104 Cal.
App. 2d 482, 231 P.2d 552 (1951) (implied duty to perform roof installation with
care, skill, expedience and faithfulness); Jose-Balz Co. v. DeWitt, 93 Ind. App.
672, 176 N.E. 864 (1931) ("It is an implied part of every builders [sic.] contract
that he will use reasonable skill in his work"); Hebert v. Pierrotti, 205 So. 2d 888
(La. Ct. of App. 1968) (contract to move house implied duty to perform in a
"skillful, careful, diligent, and good workmanlike manner"); Gosselin v. Better
Homes, Inc., 256 A.2d 629 (Me. 1969) (in construction contract, law implies duty
to perform in a "reasonably skillful and workmanlike manner"); Johnson v.
Metcalfe, 209 Md. 537, 121 A.2d 825 (1956) (duty to perform electrical
installations with "skill and care" implied); George v. Goldman, 333 Mass. 496,
131 N.E.2d 772 (1956) (party contracting to build house agrees "by implication to
do a workmanlike job"); Nash v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 383 Mich. 136, 174
N.W.2d 818 (1970) ("Every contract of employment includes an obligation,
whether express or implied, to perform in a diligent and reasonably skillful
workmanlike manner."); Mayer Ice Mach. & Eng'r. Co. v. Van Voorhis, 88 N.J.L.
7, 95 A. 735 (1915) (implied in contract is agreement that "work shall be done in a
proper and workmanlike manner"); Duenewald Printing Corp. v. G. P. Putnam's
Sons, 276 App. Div. 26, 92 N.Y.S.2d 553 (1949) (professionals bound to exercise

1978]

Ryan Indemnity

69

The warranty in the bunkering contract implied by the Fairmont
court was used to place the full loss on the oil company providing the
tugs. There were indications that the court might have considered
the shipowner negligent,141 but the court believed that negligence
was not significant in considering whether there should be full
recovery under the Ryan warranty. The "active hindrance" standard
of Weyerhaeuser was applied, and the shipowner recovered on the
warranty because his conduct was no "hindrance" to the tug's
performance.
The particular merits or problems in the Fairmont decision, or
any other recent decision, are not the subject of this article. The
point is that Fairmont, and other property damage cases predicated
on breach of an implied contractual warranty, could have been
decided on a more forthright basis using comparative negligence
concepts. If the shipowner in Fairmont was free of fault, then the full
damages should have fallen on the oil company. On the other hand,
if the shipowner's negligence to some extent contributed to the
damages (albeit it did not hinder the tugs), then damages could have
been fairly allocated based on the comparative degrees of fault.
American admiralty law in the past five years has taken great
steps toward comparative negligence and harmony with the law of
most other major maritime nations. It remains to be seen how much
of an obstacle lies in the vestiges of the Ryan implied w"arranty.
reasonable skill), rev'd on other grounds, 301 N.Y. 569, 93 N.E.2d 452 (1950); Gore
v. Sindelar, 74 N.E.2d 414 (Ohio Ct. App. 1947) (absent contrary provision,
warranty of workmanlike performance implied); Tharpe v. G. E. Moore Co., 254
S.C. 196, 174 S.E.2d 397 (1970) (construction contract impliedly includes
obligation to perform in workmanlike manner); Garlitz v. Carrasco, 339 S.W.2d
92 (Tex. Ct. App. 1960) (personal service contract contains implied covenant for
performance in "good and workmanlike manner"); Mann v. Clowser, 190 Va.
887, 59 S.E.2d 78 (1950) (implied duty in construction contract to perform in
"reasonably good and workmanlike manner"); Hoye v. Century Builders, Inc., 52
Wash. 2d 830, 329 P.2d 474 (1958) (implied warranty of workmanlike performance
required house to be fit for human habitation).
140. 9 S. WILUSTON, CONTRACTS § 1012C at 39 (3d ed. 1967). If there be support at
common law for implying warranties of workmanlike performance, then there is
also support at common law for permitting express disclaimers to negate or limit
the applicability of such a warranty. The Uniform Commercial Code provisions
governing contracts of sale do permit the negation and limitation of certain
implied warranties. U.C.C. § 2-316. Where two commercial parties negotiate at
arm's length and decide to include a written disclaimer of any implied
warranties, courts should honor the stated intention. Where written contracts
exist between commercial entities such as shipowners and stevedores and other
maritime contractors, the court should be reluctant to imply warranty into such
written contracts.
141. 511 F.2d at 1260, 1975 A.M.C. at 273.
Chevron presses on us one final argument: It claims that the
Western Eagle's own conduct in putting herself in a position of danger
under conditions of adverse visibility, wind and current should bar
Fairmont from recovery. Again, if this were a negligence case, we might
have more difficulty. But negligence alone will not bar a plaintiff from
recovering for breach of warranty of workmanlike performance.
Id.

